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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
FRED D. HUDSON, dba Hudson
Investment Co.,

Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
BETTILYON'S, INC., a corporation
dba Bettilyon's Construction Com-'
pany,
Defendant and Respondent.

No.
10378

BRIEF OF RESPONDEN·r·

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action brought by the Plaintiff to collect
the balance due on a promissory note, secured by an
Assigment of Earnings to become due from a subcontract between Defendant, Bettilyon Construction
Company, and one, Lynn Gawan, d/b/a Structural
Components Company, for the installation of a roof
structure on a building located at 2220 South 2nd West,
Salt Lake City, Utah. The Defendant made one pay-
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ment to the Plaintiff under the Assignment, in the
amount of $15,300.00, but prior to the time when the
last payment came due, a lien in the amount of $17,879. 78 was filed against the building for materials
furnished to the construction by General Builders
Supply Company, Inc. Bettilyon Construction Com.
pany paid the final payment to General Builders Sup.
ply, Inc., and obtained a release of this lien and the
Plaintiff now claims that he is entitled to have his
promissory note paid by the Defendant, for its refusal
to make the final payment to the Plaintiff in accord.
ance with the Assignment of Earnings.
DISPOSITION JN LOWER COURT
After hearing the evidence, the Honorable Stewart
M. Hanson issued a Memorandum Decision on March
25, 1965, dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint, with preju·
dice, on the following three grounds:
I. The Assignment was an Assignment of Earn-

ings only.
2. That the Plaintiff had been paid by receipt of
a check of $15,300.00.
3. That the Defendant was entitled to offset any
amounts due Ga wan under Section 13 (j) of the Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Defendant seeks to have the Judgment of
the Lower Court sustained.
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STATElHENT OF FACTS
Defendant agrees with Plaintiff's second paragraph in his Statement of Facts, but the remainder
of the Statement contains information not material to
the case or is argumentive. Therefore, Defendant
chooses to summarize the facts of the case as follows:
Bettilyon Construction Company, Defendant and
Respondent (herein referred to as "Defendant"), was
the General Contractor for the construction of an office
and warehouse building for the owner, Freeway Industrial Park, a corporation. On September 28, 1962,
Defendant entered into a sub-contract agreement with
Lynn Gawan, d/b/a Structural Components Company
(Exhibit D-4), for the furnishing of labor and materials for the installation of a "glu-lam" roof structure,
for a total contract price of $30,482.00.
In the latter part of October, 1962, Gawan approached Plaintiff to borrow money and proposed to
assign the sub-contract as security. On or about October
25, 1962, Lynn Gawan presented the "Assignment of
Earnings" (Exhibit P-9) to B. Lue Bettilyon, President of Bettilyon Construction Company, for signature ( T-38). The first and third paragraphs of the
"Assignment of Earnings" were prepared in the office
of the Plaintiff ( T-63) . The second paragraph was
added by Mr. Bettilyon prior to his signature on the
document ( T-59).
Between the dates of November 12, 1962 and
December 26, 1962, General Builders Supply Com-
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pany, Inc., furnished materials to the building project,
ordered by Lynn Gawan, at a total valuation of $17,879. 78, but nothing was paid on this account by Lynn
Ga wan.
On December 20, 1962, Defendant issued a check
for part payment on the sub-contract, made payable
jointly to Structural Components Company and Hudson Investment Company (Exhibit D-2) . The check
was endorsed by Hudson Investment Company, by
Fred D. Hudson. On February 19, 1963, General
Builders Supply Company, Inc., filed a lien against
the construction property, in the amount of $17,879.78.
When Lynn Gawan refused to discharge the said lien,
Bettilyon Construction Company issued a check to the
said lien claimant, in the amount of $15,182.00 (Exhibit D-3) and obtained a release of the lien (Exhibit
D-7).
flaintiff now claims that the check (Exhibit D-3)
should have been made payable to Plaintiff in accordance with the terms of the Assignment.

POINT I.
POINT I. THE PARTIES DID NOT INTEND TRI-LATERALLY THAT THE
PLAINTIFF WOULD BE THE. JOINT
p A YEE OF ALL OF THE PROCEEDS TO
'VHICH THE SAID SUB-CONTRACTOR
WAS ENTITLED UNDER THE TERMS OF
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THE CONTRACT, BUT ONLY TO THE
EARNINGS OF THE SUB-CONTRACTOR.
The Plaintiff, in his argument, infers that the
word "earnings" is a term with a variety of meanings.
Actually, it is a commonly used word with a generally
understood meaning and in the context of the "Assignment of Earnings" (Exhibit P-9), it has a clear and
concise meaning. In this case, it clearly means the
profit, as contrasted to the gross income or gross proceeds from the contract.
Black's Law Dictionary defines "earnings" as
"The gains of the person derived from his services or
labor without the aid of capital. (Emphasis added).
'Vithout the aid of capital, means the cost of
labor or material or the capital contribution that a
person must put into a job to earn a return. This
intent is clearly evident from most of the decisions
which have attempted to define the term and this meaning is only lost in those cases where the Court is attempting to construe statutory definitions of the term or
the meaning of the term under specific statutory usage.
For example, Plaintiff, in his brief, refers to the
case of Springville Coal Mining Co., Plaintiff in err.
vs. State Industrial Commission, et al, Defendants,
126 N .E. 133, 22 ALR 859, for the statement that
"earnings are either gross or net earnings." This case
does not stand for that proposition, but this was a situation involving the construction of the Workmen's
Compensation Statute of Illinois and whether the
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term "earnings" meant gross pay before the usual
deductions. Obviously, this type of situation does not
involve the common usage of the word; particularlv
a sub-contract requiring the furnishing of labor a~d
materials to a construction job. We have not found
any cases (including those cited by the Plaintiff) that
hold that the term includes an ambiguous concept of
both "net earnings" and "gross earnings".
A good example of the type of usage that we are
referring to is found in the Montana case of Dayton
vs. Ewart, 72 P. 420 (1903). In this case, the Appellant had attached certain gold dust that had been mined
by the Respondent and sold in satisfaction of a judgment. The Respondent claimed that the gold dust was
exempt from execution under a statute which provided
that there should be exempt from execution "the earnings of the judgment debtor for his personal services
rendered. . . . " The Court said:

"Between the terms 'wages' and 'salary' there
is no material difference when they are applied
to the subject here under consideration. The
former term is commonly used to denote the
compensation of laborers, and the latter that of
.other persons of more permanent employment
and more elevated stations. The term 'earnings'
is more comprehensive than either of the others.
It implies, as do they, that t~e sum due s~all be
claimed for the personal services of the cla1ma~t,
and that it shall not include, to any substantial
extent, recompense for materials furnished; but
earnings need not result from work done under
the direction of another nor from manual labor."
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The document the Court is asked to construe is
entitled "Assignment of Earnings". The first paragraph says: (Exhibit P-9)
. "I, Lynn Gawan agree to assign all my earnmgs on ~ 30,482.00 co~tract, between myself
and Bethlyon Construction Company job #E
1262 dated 28 Sept. 1962, to the Hudson Investment Company (313 East 9th South) to
secure a note on myself by Hudson Investment
Company".
The only logical meaning that can be given to the
term "earnings", under these circumstances, is the
definition given by the case cited above. Mr. B. Lue
Bettilyon, testified that the profit on this job would
amount to approximately 203 to 253 (T 34-35).
Mr. Lynn Gawan had submitted a bid and certainly
knew the cost of the labor and materials that were to
go into the construction of the roof. He also knew that
under his contract and the general contract, that labor
and materials would have to be paid before he could
expect to receive his final settlement. Only by a wild
stretch of the imagination is it possible to torture the
meaning of the word "earnings" to include the cost
and expense of labor and materials.
One of the basic rules of construction is that "plain
unequivocal terms or in terms susceptible of interpretation and construction under recognized rules of law
are bound by the meaning of the contract which is
reached by a proper interpretation". 17 Am Jur (2d),
358 (Contracts, Paragraph 21). The word "earnings"
has only one meaning as used in this document.
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The third paragraph of the Assignment of Earnings (Exhibit P-9) has some interesting language. It
says:
"Bettilyon Construction Company agrees to
make all checks and payments due on the above
herein described job payable to Hudson Investment Company and Structural Components
Company together and that no payments on this
job will be made in any other manner. The above
assignment is agreeable to Bettilyon Construction Company".
The sub-contract agreement, Paragraph 13, Indemnification, states:
"The SUBCONTRACTOR agrees to satisfy
immediately any lien pr encumbrance filed
against the premises arising by reason of work
performed pursuant to this Subcontract, or any
work sublet by the said SUBCONTRACTOR,
and to indemnify and save harmless the CONTRACTOR from and against any and all liens,
suits, claims, actions, losses, costs, penalties, and
damages of whatsoever kind or nature, including attorney fees, arising out of, in connection
with, or incident to the Agreement."
Under this sub-contract, where a lien is filed prior
to the final payment, the general contractor had the
right to settle the claim and discharge the lien and
it took all of the funds due on the sub-contract to
settle the lien, then there were no ''payments due"
under the contract. That is the situation in this case.
Plaintiff has argued vaguely, that Paragraph 13,
since it is on the reverse side of the document, does not
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form a part of the sub-contract. However, Paragraph
I entitled "The Contract Documents", has this provision in bold face print "THE PROVISIONS
PRINTED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF ARE REFERRED TO AND l\1ADE A
PART OF THIS AGREEMENT". Clearly, there
is no question that the terms and conditions on the
reverse side of the document can be incorporated into
the agreement itself, if that is clearly the intent of the
parties. In addition, the last line of the bottom of the
first page of this sub-contract agreement states: "Provisions printed on reverse side hereof are part of this
Agreement and binding upon the parties hereto)".
There certainly could be no question that the parties
intended to bind themselves to the provisions on the
reverse side of the document.
The Plaintiff states that the Assignment (Exhibit
P-9) was probably prepared by Lynn Gawan. However, Mr. Fred Hudson testified as follows : ( T -63)

Q Mr. Hudson, I presume this assignment, all

except for the second paragraph, was prepared
in your off ice, was it not 1
A I don't know definitely, Mr. Bettilyon, but I
was under the impression it was, but don't know
definitely."
This document certainly was not prepared by the
Defendant, since when the document was presented to
~Ir. B. Lue Bettilyon, he added the second paragraph
and the two other paragraphs are obviously typed on
a different typewriter. The authorship of this docu-
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ment must be credited to the Plaintiff and Plaintiff
is not able to pass it off as a product of Mr. Lynn
Gawan. Plaintiff relied upon this document; he required it as a condition of the loan that he made to
Lynn Gawan and, therefore, in accordance with the
rules of construction, it must be construed against the
person preparipg the document. Thus rule is cited in
17 Am Jur (2d} 689 (Contracts, Paragraph 276):
"It is fundamental that doubtful language
in a contract should be interpreted most strongly
again~t the party who has selected that language,
especially where he seeks to use such language
to defeat the contract or its operation, unless
the use of such language in the contract is prescribed by law. Also, in case of doubt or ambiguity a contract will be construed most strongly
against the party who drew or prepared it, or
whose attorney drew or prepared it. Another
form in which substantially the same rule is
stated is that where doubt exists as to the construction of an instrument prepared by one party
thereto or his attorney, upon the faith of which
the other has incurred an obligation, that construction will be adopted which will be favorable to the latter." (See, also, Handley vs. Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York,
106 Utah 184, 147 P. (2d}, 319, 152 ALR,
1278}.

POINT 2.
POINT 2. THERE WAS NO SEPARATE,
VALID OR ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT
THAT CAME INTO BEING BETWEEN
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PLAINTIF:F AND DEFENDANT, IN THIS
ACTION.
The P!aintiff has set out, in his Brief, under Point

:2, the reqmrements for an enforceable contract, includ-

ing a consideration. In this case, the Plaintiff has not
alleged nor was any evidence, whatsoever, introduced
as to the nature of the consideration for the so-called
contract, between Hudson Investment Company and
Bettilyon Construction Company. In fact, this was
not even argued in the trial of the case in the District
Court; this is new matter on this appeal.
17 Am J ur ( 2d) 427 (Contracts, Paragraph 85),
defines consideration as follows:
"Technically, consideration is defined as some
right, interest, profit, or benefit accruing to one
party, or some forbearance, detriment; loss, or
responsibility given, suffered, or undertaken by
the other. Again, consideration for a promise is
defined as an act or a forbearance ; or the creation, modification, or destruction of a legal relation; or a return promise bargained for and given
in exchange for the promise. Consideration is,
in effect, the price bargained for and paid for
a promise--that is, something given in exchange
for the promise."
Defendant has received no "right, interest, profit,
or benefit", nor has the Plaintiff given up anything
of value to the Defendant. Interestingly, the Plaintiff
does not even suggest, in his Brief, of what the consideration consisted. Paragraph 86 on Contracts, in the
same volume, states as follows:
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. "It i~ w~ll settled, as a general rule, that consideration 1s an essenti!l~ element ?f, and is necessary to the enforceability or validity of, a contract. It follows from this rule that a promise
not supported by any consideration cannot
amount to a contract or be enforced, and that
want or lack of consideration is an excuse for
nonperformances of a promise. In order for a
contract to be :alid and binding, each party must
be bound to give some legal consideration to the
other by conferring a benefit upon him or suffering a legal detriment at his request".

Since there was no consideration, it cannot now
be claimed that Plaintiff and Defendant entered into
a contract.

POINT 3.
POINT 3. PLAINTIFF WAS PAID.
The Lower Court, in its Memorandum Decision,
in Paragraph 2, made the following finding:
"The Court finds that the Plaintiff was paid."
The Plaintiff states, in his Brief, that it is difficult
for him to understand on what basis this finding was
made, but the Plaintiff admits that he received a check
in the amount of $15,300.00 (Exhibit D-2), and that
he endorsed this check. What he did with the funds
from this check is immaterial in this lawsuit. In defining the term "payment", the Oklahoma Supreme Court,
in the case of Hill vs. Henry, 124 P. (2d) 405, page
408, says, " ... the term 'payment' ... denotes de-
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livery to the obligee (or creditor), in satisfaction of
the claim or demand". In this case, a check for $15,300.00 was delivered to the Plaintiff. He endorsed
it and he accepted it. The Defendant was entitled to
rely upon delivery of the check and the cashing of the
same by the Plaintiff, or anyone else to whom he
delivered the check, after proper endorsement, as payment and as satisfaction of the claim. It is true that
under these circumstances, such payment might have
been received, but not intended by any of the parties
as payment of the obligation, but if this were the case,
then it would be mandatory upon the creditor to give
clear and immediate notice to the assignee, that such
payment was not accepted as payment in full. In this
case, the Plaintiff stated, at the end of the case, after
all of the evidence was in, that he telephoned Mr. B.
Lue Bettilyon concerning the $15,300.00 check (T-65),
but only inquired as to whether there was another pay'"'
ment due. This conversation was denied by Mr. B. Lue
Bettilyon ( T-66) . The Plaintiff, on cross-examination,
in response to questioning concerning this check, testified (T- 39-40):
"Q Did you discuss with Mr. Gawan the nature
of this job?
A He told me it was a roofing job, Sir.

Q Did you ask him how much of the job would

be materials and labor?

A No, sir.
Q But you realize that a great part of it would
be materials and labor?
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A Yes, sir; a certain part of it, certainly. How
much, I don't know.

Q Did he tell you that he was borrowing the
money to pay for the materials?
A No, sir.
Q Why didn't you take any money out of the
first check that was given to him?
A Mr. Gawan said he was short on cash at that
time, and there was considerable left, and the
remainder of the payment would come due before the note was due.
Q But you didn't bother to inquire about
whether or not he paid material and labor bills
on the job?
A No, sir; I didn't.
Q You didn't bother to inquire as to whetherwhat the extent of those bills would be and how
much would have to come out of the final check?
A No, sir; I didn't.

Q The assignment said, "I, Lynn Gawan, agree
to assign to you all money earned on a $30,482.00
contract," and you never at any tj-!lle asked him
how much the earnings of the job were going
to be?
A I didn't feel I had to do so because Bettilyon
Construction, with the acknowledgment, agreed
to pay all payments on the job to me and the
total amount of payments was over $30,000.00".
Mr. B. Lue Bettilyon testified concerning this
matter as follows T-34):
"Q Now at the time that the check, ExhibitTHE COURT: D-2
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Q (By Mr. ~ettilyon) D-2 was delivered, did

you ever receive any telephone call or inquiry
from Hudson Investment Company relative to
that?
A No, I did not.

'? Did ~udson Investment Company at any
tune notify you that they had not received all
of the proceeds of that check?
A No. As a matter of fact, I assumed that they
had.

Q \Vould you have been able to help them if
they had called you?
A If they had called me prior to them endorsing the check, yes.

Q What would you have told them?
A I would have immediately investigated with
General Builders Supply to find out if these
material bills had been paid.

Q But you never received any call or notice?
A None whatever. The first notice I had of any
problem was when General Builders Supply
called about sometime late in December and
there was quite an unpaid bill on the job."
Surely, the Plaintiff, under these circumstances,
had a duty and an obligation to put the contractor on
notice that he was not being paid out of the $15,300.00
check, and any risk that the Plaintiff took by not obtaining his money when he had opportunity, must be
assumed by him and cannot now be passed onto an
innocent third party, the Defendant in this case.
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POINT 4.
POINT 4. THE PLAINTIFF'S REcov.
ERY IS BARRED BY RULE 13(j) OF THE
UTAH RULES OF CIYIL PROCEDURE.
Rule 13 (j ) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provides as follows:
"Except as otherwise provided by l,aw as to
negotiable instruments and assignments of accounts receivable, any claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim which could have been asse;ted
against an assignor at the time of or before notice of such assignment, may be asserted against
his assignee, to the extent that such claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim does not exceed recovery
upon the claim of the assignee."
Plaintiff argues that the words "at the time of or
before notice of such assignment" removes this rule
from having effect in this factual situation because
the assignment to the Plaintiff occurred sometime in
October, 1963, and the materials were furnished during
the dates of November 12, 1962, to December 26,
1962. Plaintiff, therefore, argues that the right of the
materialman and the right of the Defendant to offset
did not arise until November 12, 1962. There are sev·
eral reasons why this reasoning is faulty:
(a) The rights of Bettilyon Construction Com·
pany against Lynn Gawan arose at least with the
execution of the sub-contract on September 28, 1962,
and probably, even before this, as is pointed out
below. An assignee of a non-negotiable claim cannot
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stand in any better position than does his assignor.
The assignee must take subject to all defenses or
equities that could have been asserted or may at any
time in the future be asserted against the assignor.
This rule is stated in 6 Am. Jur. (2d), 282 (Paragraph 102, Assignments) :
" ... the general rule is that an assignee of a
n.on-negotiable chose in action acquires no greater
right than was possessed by his assignor, and
simply stands in the shoes of the latter.
In an action on the claim assigned, the assignee is ordinarily subject to any setoff or
counterclaim available to the obligor against
the assignor and to all other defenses and equities which could have been asserted against the
chose in the hands of the assignor at the time of
the assignment."
:Mr. Hudson acknowledged on direct examination by
his counsel that he saw the subcontract agreement
(Exhibit D-4) prior to the time that he loaned the
money to Gawan (T-29-30). He knew that the right
of Mr. Gawan to receive any money was dependent
upon his performance under the contract and his compliance with all of the terms and conditions of the
contract. He could not, at any time, acquire any
greater rights than Mr. Gawan had in the contract.
(b) The rights of a materialman do not date
from the time of furnishing labor or materials, but
the lien "shall relate back to, and take effect of, the
time of the commencement to do work or furnish
materials on the ground for the structure or improve-
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ment and shall have priority over any lien, mortgage
or other encumbrance which may have attached subsequently to the time when the building improvement
or structure was commenced, work begun or first
material furnished on the ground ... ," 38-1-5, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953. Therefore, any assignment
by a subcontractor would be subject to the prior claim
of materialmen who furnished materials at the request
of the subcontractor even though the materials were
furnished after the assigmnent.
( c) Another reason why Plaintiff's reasoning
must fail is that under the provisions of 14-2-2, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, the owner of the property
must require a bond from the general contractor and
the general contractor from his subcontractors, or the
owner of the property is directly liable to the materialmen or laborers who do work or furnish materials for
the job, even though there is no direct contractual
relationship between the owner and such materialmen or laborers. Therefore, under the general contract, the owner has a right of offset against the general contractor for payment of any liens that may be
filed against the job, and the general contractor has
the right of off set against the subcontractors for any
liens that have not been paid, or as in this case, the
general contractor has a right to pay the lien directly
and discharge the same, and deduct the same out of
the proceeds due the subcontractor.
In this case, the rights of setoff against Lynn
Ga wan, d/b/ a Structural Components Company, prob20

ably dates back to the date of the original general contract between the owner of the property and the general contractor, Bettilyon Construction Company, because the subcontract agreement between Bettilyon and
Gawan incorporates the general contract by reference
in Paragraph l thereof (Exhibit D-4). In any event,
the date of setoff certainly begins as of September 28,
1962, the date of the subcontract. Rule 13 (j) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure therefore applies in
this case.
There is one other matter that we add to this Brief,
perhaps immaterial, but we feel quite significant. The
Plaintiff does not come into Court, in this matter, with
clean hands. The note (Exhibit P-1) which he is attempting to collect was, supposedly, purchased from
one, Alden Gibbs, for a discount of between $750.00
to $1200.00 (T-36). Yet, surprisingly, Mr. Hudson
has never met Alden Gibbs, nor had any business dealings with him (except for a telephone call) and, even
more surprising, is the fact that the promissory note
which, supposedly, was prepared for Alden Gibbs, contains the provision "this note and interest thereon is
secured by assignment of earnings on a $30,482.00 contract between Structural Components Company and
Bettilyon Construction Company. When Mr. Gawan
went in to borrow money in the first place, he was informed that it would have to be done by discounting
a note (T-42). Mr. Gawan says the note was prepared
in the office of Hudson Investment Company (T-42),
and then taken to Mr. Alden Gibbs for endorsement.
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There was an assignment already on the note but it was
crossed out and Mr. Ga wan testified ( T-43) that the
present endorsement was placed on the note by Mr.
Gibbs. Mr. Hudson denied that the note had been
typed in his office. l\'Ir. Hudson, also, does not recall
whether or not the check for the money that he paid
for the note had the name of "Alden Gibbs" on it or
not. Yet, he was purchasing the note from Mr. Gibbs
- not making a direct loan to Lynn Gawan. All of
this, while, perhaps, immaterial to the main issues in
this case, simply indicates that this note was, obviously. ,
a device for charging a higher rate of interest than is
allowed by law. By using the apparent subterfuge of
purchasing a note at discount, l\Ir. Hudson for $2500.00,
more or less, expected to receive a return of $3,750.00,
between October 25, 1962, and December 29, 1962, a
very nice return indeed. Now, with his hands so obviously dirty in this transaction, Mr. Hudson would ask
that the Ciurt enforce this usurious document and make
the Defendant, who has acted in good faith on this
matter from the beginning, pay a sum of money twice-once to the person who is entitled to receive it (General
Builders Supply Company) and, secondly, to the
Plaintiff in this action, who is, obviously, not entitled
to receive it.

CONCLUSION
We conclude by referring to the Memorandum
Decision of Judge Stewart M. Hanson below (R-16A)
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1. The Assignment was an Assignment of Earn-

ings only and not of the entire proceeds of the contract.
2. The Plaintiff was paid when he received and
accepted a check for $15,300.00.

3. The Defendant is entitled to the benefit of
Rule 13 (j) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and was

entitled to offset any sums due for materials that had
not been paid by Lynn Gawan.
KIRTON & BETTILYON
Respectfully submitted,

Verden E. Bettilyon
Attorney for Defendant and
Respondent
336 South Third East

Salt Lake City, Utah

Mailed two copies of the fore going Brief to John
Elwood Dennett, Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant, 1243 East 2100 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, this
9th day of August, 1965.
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